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CLARENCE THOMAS, FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS, AND THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Scott D. Gerber *
I was flattered to be invited to participate in a February 21,
2014, symposium at the University of Chicago Law School spon-
sored by the Midwest Black Law Students Association about "Af-
firmative Action: Past, Present & Future." The organizers said
that they invited me because they thought I would say something
different from my colleagues at the event. They were correct. Af-
ter all, academia is dominated by the Left, and racial preferences
are the sacred cow of the Left, whereas I am a libertarian who
sincerely believes that racial preferences are unconstitutional.!
More importantly, Clarence Thomas thinks they are unconstitu-
tional, and he is coming closer with each passing Term to convinc-
ing a majority of his colleagues on the U.S. Supreme Court of this
fact.
I have written and spoken a lot about Justice Thomas's juris-
prudence over the years,2 and the organizers and I decided that it
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law. I thank Roger
Clegg and George Dent for comments on a draft of this article. I also thank Eric Segall and
his faculty colleagues at Georgia State University College of Law for inviting me to pre-
sent it there on March 31, 2014, and Brown University's Political Theory Project for host-
ing me while I edited it. The article is dedicated to Peg Cain, my wonderful administrative
assistant who retired in December 2013 after nearly four decades of great work at Ohio
Northern University.
1. See, e.g., ScOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 173-75 (1995) [hereinafter
GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS]. My most recent legal thriller uses a fictionalized U.S.
Supreme Court challenge to racial preferences in higher education as the lawsuit that
drives the story forward. See ScOT'f DOUGLAS GERBER, MR. JUSTICE: A NOVEL (2011); Scott
Douglas Gerber, The Fact of Legal Fiction, THE BENCHER, Nov.[Dec. 2013, at 18, 19, http:
H/inns.innsofcourt.org/for-members/current-members/the-bencher/recent-bencher-articles/
novemberdecember-2013/the-fact-of-legal-fiction.aspx. For an excellent libertarian civil
rights reader, see RACE & LIBERTY IN AMERICA: THE ESSENTIAL READER (Jonathan Bean
ed., 2009).
2. See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CLARENCE THOMAS (1999; expanded ed. 2002) [hereinafter GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES];
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might be interesting for everyone if my contribution to the sym-
posium endeavored to place Justice Thomas's concurring opinion
in Fisher v. University of Texas ("Fisher F')' in the larger context
of his voluminous writings on race in general and affirmative ac-
tion in particular. This article does that, and it also discusses the
commentary on Justice Thomas's Fisher I opinion because the re-
action to what he writes, especially on matters of race, is almost
as important as the opinions themselves.4 The article concludes
with some brief comments on Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Af-
firmative Action, a 2014 case about the constitutionality of a 2006
amendment to the Michigan state constitution banning racial
preferences in Michigan,5 and on Fisher v. University of Texas
("Fisher If'),' which the Court will be deciding by the end of June
2016. Justice Scalia's recent death figures prominently in the
concluding section.
I. FISHER I(2013)
In Fisher I, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 7-1 opinion by Justice
Kennedy, vacated and remanded the ruling of the U.S. Court of
Scott D. Gerber, Clarence Thomas, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 736 (David Schultz ed., 2009); Scott D. Gerber, Justice for Clarence Thom-
as: An Intellectual History of Justice Thomas's Twenty Years on the Supreme Court, 88 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 667 (2011) [hereinafter Gerber, Justice for Clarence Thomas]; Scott
Douglas Gerber, The Partisan Reaction to Clarence Thomas's My Grandfather's Son: How
Reviewers Have Proven Themselves Unable to Put Politics Aside to Provide a Fair Assess-
ment of the Justice's Memoir, FINDLAW (Dec. 4, 2007), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/books
/reviews/20071204_gerber.html (reviewing CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A
MEMOIR (2007)); Scott D. Gerber, Opinion, The Ideas of Justice Thomas, WASH. POST (July
28, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1998/07/28/the-ideas-of-justi
ce-thomas/3023d71f-2ae5-48bf-95b7-el43c5c2d9ab/; Scott D. Gerber, Clarence Thomas and
the Declaration of Independence, Presentation at the Princeton University James Madison
Program in Ideas and Institutions Conference on the Declaration of Independence (Apr. 5,
2002) (on file with author); Scott D. Gerber, Book Discussion on The Jurisprudence of
Clarence Thomas, C-SPAN (Jan. 27, 1999), http://www.c-span.org/videoP119622-1book-
discussion-jurisprudence-clarence-thomas. For a recent book that tracks the arguments I
articulated in my book about Justice Thomas, see RALPH A. ROSSUM, UNDERSTANDING
CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION (2014). For an
example of what I have said about Justice Thomas in media interviews, see John Blake,
Three Questions for Clarence Thomas, CNN (June 25, 2013), http://www.cnn.com2013/06/
09/us/clarence-thomas-three-questions (an interview about Fisher v. University of Texas
and Shelby County v. Holder).
3. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher 1), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
4. See, e.g., GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 2.
5. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
6. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I1), 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135
S. Ct. 2888 (June 29, 2015) (No. 14-981).
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit The Fifth Circuit had affirmed the
decision of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas that the University of Texas's affirmative action admis-
sions policy met the standards of Grutter v. Bollinger: that an in-
stitution of higher education may consider the race of applicants
as a factor in admissions decisions, provided that race is not used
too mechanically and that all applicants are evaluated on an in-
dividualized basis.9 Justice Kennedy concluded for the Court that
the Fifth Circuit had failed to apply strict scrutiny in its decision
upholding the admissions policy. ° The Court faulted the Fifth
Circuit for presuming that the University had acted in good faith
and for placing the burden of rebutting that presumption upon
Ms. Fisher, the white plaintiff who had been denied admission to
the University." The Court reminded the lower court that, under
Grutter, the burden rested primarily with the University to prove
that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the ed-
ucational benefits of diversity.2
Justice Kagan recused herself from the case.3 Justice Scalia
wrote a one-paragraph concurring opinion in which he noted that
he remains convinced that race-based admissions practices are
unconstitutional, but that Ms. Fisher did not ask the Court to
overturn Grutter.4 Justice Ginsburg issued the only dissent in the
case." She insisted that the lower courts were correct in conclud-
ing that the University's admission policy satisfied the Grutter
requirements."
II. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRING OPINION IN FISHER I
Justice Thomas's practice has tended to be to pen lengthy opin-
ions the first time an issue comes before him on the Supreme
7. Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2415, 2422, 2432.
8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (University of Michigan law school case);
see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (University of Michigan undergraduate
school case).
9. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher 1), 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S.
Ct. at 2411.
10. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-22.
11. Id. at 2420.
12. Id. at 2421.
13. Id. at 2422.
14. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 2432 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 2434.
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Court and to write shorter opinions that refer back to the rele-
vant lengthy opinion if the Court is revisiting a particular issue.7
His separate opinion in Fisher I does not conform to this pattern.
While it is true that Justice Thomas cited a number of his prior
civil rights opinions in Fisher I-Missouri v. Jenkins; 5 Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia;5 Grutter v. Bollinger2°-he supple-
mented those citations with detailed arguments that buttressed
them." This confirms what I concluded in a 2007 essay about Jus-
tice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Virginia v. Black, in which he
insisted that cross-burning is not entitled to First Amendment
protection22: questions of racial justice concern him more than
those in any other area of law.23
In an eleven-page concurring opinion in Fisher I, Justice
Thomas equated the racial classifications embraced by the Uni-
versity of Texas with two of the Supreme Court's most reviled de-
cisions24 : Korematsu v. United States, in which the Court permit-
ted the internment of people with Japanese ancestry during
World War II;25 and Plessy v. Ferguson,2 wherein the Court en-
dorsed the "separate-but-equal" doctrine eventually rejected
unanimously in Brown v. Board of Education.27 Justice Thomas
thundered: "[W]hile the University admits that racial discrimina-
tion in admissions is not ideal, it asserts that it is a temporary
17. GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES (expanded ed.), supra note 2, at 290-91; see, e.g., Reno
v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 490-97 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting
that he "continue[d] to adhere to the views [he] expressed in Holder v. Hall," before elabo-
rating further about why he was troubled by the Court's decision making in redistricting
cases).
18. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
19. Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
21. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
22. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
23. See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Thomas and the Burning Cross, FIRST AMENDMENT
CTR. (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/justice-thomas-and-the.burning-
cross; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 394-95 (explaining his conclusion that the Virginia stat-
ute prohibited conduct, not expression). Justice Thomas's prior departures from concisely
referring back to his initial opinion on a similar subject occurred when the Court was re-
visiting questions about racial justice. See GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES (expanded ed.), su-
pra note 2, at 290-91.
24. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422-32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
25. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
26. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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necessity because of the enduring race consciousness of our socie-
ty.... [T]he University echoes the hollow justifications advanced
by the segregationists" in previous cases.28
The essence of Justice Thomas's civil rights jurisprudence is
his belief that equality under the Constitution requires that every
person be treated as an individual rather than as a member of a
racial, ethnic, or religious group.2" Justice Thomas's individualis-
tic approach to civil rights law was in full sail when the Court's
lone African American Justice reminded Texas's flagship institu-
tion of higher education that the "Equal Protection Clause guar-
antees every person the right to be treated equally by the State,
without regard to race. 'At the heart of this [guarantee] lies the
principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals,
and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups."'' °
And it is because the Equal Protection Clause guarantees every
American's constitutional right to be treated as an individual,
Justice Thomas insisted, that the Court 'must subject all racial
classifications to the strictest of scrutiny.' Under strict scrutiny,
all racial classifications are categorically prohibited unless they
are 'necessary to further a compelling government interest."'' Un-
fortunately for the University of Texas, Justice Thomas contin-
ued:
[T]he educational benefits flowing from student body diversity-
assuming they exist-hardly qualify as a compelling state interest.
Indeed, the argument that educational benefits justify racial dis-
crimination was advanced in support of racial segregation in the
1950's, but emphatically rejected by this Court. And just as the al-
leged educational benefits of segregation were insufficient to justify
racial discrimination then, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), the alleged educational benefits of diversity cannot
justify racial discrimination today.3'
Moreover, Justice Thomas pointed out that discriminatory ad-
missions programs, such as the one implemented by the Universi-
ty of Texas, harm minority students by encouraging them to en-
28. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2427 (Thomas, J., concurring).
29. See, e.g., GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 69-112 (discussing Justice
Thomas's civil rights jurisprudence).
30. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
31. Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005) and Jenkins, 515 U.S.
at 121 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
32. Id. at 2424-25.
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roll in institutions of higher education where many cannot do the
work. He wrote:
The University admits minorities who otherwise would have attend-
ed less selective colleges where they would have been more evenly
matched. But, as a result of the mismatching, many blacks and His-
panics who likely would have excelled at less elite schools are placed
in a position where underperformance is all but inevitable because
they are less academically prepared than the white and Asian stu-
33
dents with whom they must compete.
Justice Thomas made the same point another way when he
reminded colleges and universities that the "worst forms of racial
discrimination in this Nation have always been accompanied by
straight-faced representations that discrimination helped minori-
ties.,34 He added:
It is also noteworthy that, in our desegregation cases, we rejected
arguments that are virtually identical to those advanced by the Uni-
versity today. The University asserts, for instance, that the diversity
obtained through its discriminatory admissions program prepares its
students to become leaders in a diverse society .... The segregation-
ists likewise defended segregation on the ground that it provided
more leadership opportunities for blacks .... Indeed, no court today
would accept the suggestion that segregation is permissible because
historically black colleges produced Booker T. Washington, Thurgood
Marshall, Martin Luther King, Jr. and other prominent leaders.
Likewise, the University's racial discrimination cannot be justified
on the ground that it will produce better leaders.3 5
III. REACTION TO JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRING
OPINION IN FISHER I
There was not as much reaction to Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion in Fisher I as I expected, perhaps because the Supreme
Court itself did little more than remind the nation's lower courts
that "strict scrutiny" means strict scrutiny--even when the deci-
sions being challenged are those made by institutions of higher
education. Or perhaps the reason for the paucity of commentary
is that Justice Thomas's position on affirmative action has been
unambiguous for a long time. With respect to the latter possibil-
ity, Marc Morial, president and CEO of the National Urban
33. Id. at 2431.
34. Id. at 2429.
35. Id. at 2426.
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League, announced after the Fisher I decision that he has stopped
commenting on Justice Thomas's opinions because "I don't expect
Clarence Thomas to ever support affirmative action even though
he was the beneficiary of affirmative action."6
As of the date of the Midwest Black Law Students Association
symposium for which this article was originally prepared, there
had been one law review article37 and ten newspaper/news-
magazine articles commenting on Justice Thomas's Fisher I opin-
ion. Only two were penned by authors from the Right. Noted con-
servative political commentator George F. Will wrote in his Wash-
ington Post column:
In an opinion concurring with the majority's conclusion that strict
scrutiny was required but not applied to Texas's use of race, Justice
Clarence Thomas says of "racial engineering": There is no compelling
governmental interest in whatever educational benefits supposedly
flow from racial diversity that must be achieved by racial discrimi-
nation. Thomas should tell the chief justice that the way to stop dis-
crimination on the basis of race is to stop pretending that strict scru-
tiny of such discrimination somehow makes it something other than
what it is.
38
Conservative law professor Gail Heriot agreed with the "mis-
match" theory described by Justice Thomas in an article about
the Fisher I case published in the libertarian Cato Supreme Court
Review. She wrote:
There are many reasons to oppose race-preferential admissions poli-
cies. Perhaps the most fundamental is this: As Justice Clarence
Thomas discussed in his Fisher concurrence, for all the good inten-
tions of those who originated these policies, they apparently don't
work. If the mounting empirical evidence is correct, we now have
fewer African-American physicians, scientists, and engineers than
36. Elizabeth Flock, Clarence Thomas Suggests Affirmative Action Is Like Jim Crow,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 24, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/article
s/2013/06/24/clarence-thomas-suggests-affirmative-action-is-like-jim-crow (quoting Marc
Morial).
37. Several others have since been published. See, e.g., Joseph 0. Oluwole & Preston
C. Green III, Harrowing Through Narrow Tailoring: Voluntary Race-Conscious Student-
Assignment Plans, Parents Involved and Fisher, 14 WYO. L. REV. 705, 762-68 (2014) (de-
scribing Justice Thomas as "the forever lost vote" for racial preference programs).
38. George F. Will, Opinion, Court Doesn't Resolve Wrongs of Affirmative Action,
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we would have had using race-neutral methods. We have fewer col-
lege professors and lawyers too. Whatever affirmative action's legal
and constitutional status, it has backfired on its own terms.39
Of course the Left disagreed with the flattering portrayals of
Justice Thomas's opinion offered by Will and Heriot. In fact,
while my most recent assessment of the reaction to Justice
Thomas's jurisprudence reported that even his critics now tend to
express their differences with him in a far more professional tone
than they did earlier in his tenure,° such is not the case with the
Left's reaction to his separate opinion in Fisher I. I suppose that
should not be surprising-as I mentioned at the outset of this ar-
ticle, racial preferences are the sacred cow of the Left. Symmetry
dictates that I limit my discussion of this unfortunate fact to sev-
eral representative examples only.
Three particularly disturbing commentaries were published in
the Huffington Post, Twitter, and the Chicago Defender. Larry
Bodine wrote in the Huffington Post:
Clarence Thomas was especially shameless in his separate opin-
ion.... He says if it were up to him, he would pull the ladder up and
strike down the university's diversity program. Governor George
Wallace, who called out the National Guard to prevent black stu-
dents from entering the University of Alabama in 1963, would be
proud.
41
Roland Martin was more concise with his vitriol on Twitter. He
managed to insult a U.S. Supreme Court Justice in 140 charac-
ters or less: "Clarence Thomas is hilarious. I got mine but I'll
make sure you don't get yours! '42 At least Bodine and Martin were
man enough to sign their names to their mean-spirited state-
ments. An "Anonymous" submission to the Chicago Defender took
the easy way out by defaming Justice Thomas without attribu-
tion. That "brave" soul insisted that Justice Thomas had thrown a
"hissy fit" in Fisher I and that he was a "self-loather and willing
tool of the White establishment."4
39. Gail Heriot, Fisher v. University of Texas: The Court (Belatedly) Attempts to In-
voke Reason and Principle, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 64. Heriot is a member of
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
40. Gerber, Justice for Clarence Thomas, supra note 2, at 672-83.
41. Larry Bodine, Opinion, Supreme Court: How to Do Our Dirty Work Against Af-
firmative Action, HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2013, 12:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/larry-bodine/fisher-texas-supreme-court_b_3497952.html.
42. Flock, supra note 36 (quoting Roland Martin's tweet).
43. Anonymous, Clarence Thomas: Affirmative Action Policies Are Like Segregation,
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However, two respectful criticisms suggest that at least some
on the Left are willing to treat Justice Thomas with professional-
ism, even when it comes to expressing disagreement with his
views about racial preferences." The first took the form of an op-
ed in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution by a former chief justice of
the Georgia Supreme Court, Leah Ward Sears, who wrote: "I con-
tinue to respect Justice Thomas as a jurist. But I don't believe
that affirmative action can, in any way, be likened to slavery.
45
The second was an op-ed in the New York Times by Lee C. Bol-
linger, who happened to be president of the University of Michi-
gan during the Court's 2003 foray into the vexing subject of af-
firmative action in higher education. Bollinger, who is now
president of Columbia University, is worth quoting at length:
The greatest moments of jurisprudence have never been merely dry
legal analysis, but have been linked to broader principles-and his-
torical and social realities-from which they derive. One cost of
Monday's ruling may be the failure to renew a conversation about
racial justice as the civil-rights era recedes further and further into
the past. Strikingly, it was Justice Clarence Thomas who most en-
gaged the vital historical context, writing that "arguments advanced
by the University in defense of discrimination are the same as those
CHI. DEFENDER, June 26, 2013, at 8; see also Mark S. Brodin, Opinion, Supreme Court
Dodges Affirmative Action Hot Potato-Or Did It?, MASS. L. WKLY. (July 3, 2013) ("Such
accusations are as bizarre as they are defamatory. Can it be seriously contended that
turning away a white candidate in order to make room for someone from a historically un-
derrepresented demographic carries the same baggage as separating black from white
school children during the Jim Crow era, with its 'colored' and 'white' water fountains? Is
a surgeon's therapeutic amputation of a gangrenous finger the equivalent of a torturer's
similar act to inflict pain?").
44. For a model of how to present both sides of the emotional issue of racial prefer-
ences in higher education in a professional and informative fashion, see Affirmative Ac-
tion: Should Universities Consider Race in Admission?, Janus Constitution Day Lecture
Produced by the Political Theory Project at Brown University (Sept. 17, 2014), https://
www.brown.edu/academics/political-theory-project/events/20 14/09/affirmative-action-shou
ld-universities-consider-race-admission (debate between Randall Kennedy and Stuart Tay-
lor, Jr. introduced by Steven G. Calabresi). See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR
DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW (2013); RICHARD H. SANDER &
STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT'S
INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON'T ADMIT IT (2012). Kennedy has been
less kind to Justice Thomas on other occasions. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Colorblind
Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) ('Thomas's equation of racial distinc-
tion intended to impose white supremacy with racial distinctions intended to undue white
supremacy is one of the silliest formulations in all of American law.").
45. Leah Ward Sears, Opinion, Former Chief Justice of Georgia Supreme Court: Af-
firmative Action Is Not Like Slavery, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST. (June 28, 2013, 10:27
AM), http://www.ajc.comlweblogs/get-schooled/2013/jun/28/former-chief-justice-georgia-sup
reme-court-affirma/.
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advanced by the segregationists." I disagree profoundly with his log-
ic, though I admire his candor.
46
IV. JUSTICE THOMAS'S "LIBERAL ORIGINALISM" IN RACE CASES
The Left wing Center for American Progress was likewise con-
cerned about Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Fisher I, es-
pecially with respect to how different his position on racial pref-
erences is from that of the Justice he replaced, civil rights icon
Thurgood Marshall. A press release by the Center read in perti-
nent part:
In his remarkable concurring opinion, Justice Thomas invokes Jus-
tice Marshall's name, along with his arguments as a lawyer in
Brown, to assert that affirmative action violates the constitutional
rights of white college applicants. If there was any doubt before this
concurrence, it is now clear that the second black justice is doing
everything in his power to undo nearly everything that the first
black justice accomplished-as a lawyer and a judge-to ensure a
more equal society.
A blog post about Fisher I by Scott Lemieux for the liberal
American Prospect magazine provides a convenient segue for ex-
plaining why Justice Thomas disagrees with Justice Marshall
about racial preferences, and why Justice Thomas is correct to do
so. Lemieux wrote: "The original understanding of [the] 14th
Amendment can be interpreted as forbidding all state affirmative
action only if the principles of equal protection are defined at
such a high level of abstraction that there's no meaningful dis-
tinction between 'originalism' and any other form of constitution-
al interpretation.,48 Lemieux and other critics of Justice Thomas's
views about racial preferences clearly do not understand the Jus-
tice's "liberal originalism" on questions of equality;49 an original-
46. Lee C. Bollinger, Opinion, A Long, Slow Drift from Racial Justice, N.Y. TIMES
(June 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.comJ2013/06/25/opinion/a-long-slow-drift-from.racial-
justice.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0.
47. Press Release, Billy Corriher, Assoc. Dir. of Research for Legal Progress at the
Ctr. for Am. Progress, Clarence Thomas: The Anti-Thurgood Marshall (July 9, 2013),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/news/2013/07/09/69044/clarence-tho
mas-the-anti-thurgood-marshall.
48. Scott Lemieux, Opinion, Yes, Justice Thomas, Affirmative Action Is Constitutional,
AM. PROSPECT BLOG (June 25, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/yes-justice-thomas-affir
mative-action-constitutional.
49. Eric J. Segall, a respected liberal constitutional law professor who kindly invited
me to speak about Justice Thomas at Georgia State University College of Law on March
31, 2014, likewise does not understand Justice Thomas's originalism. See Eric J. Segall,
Justice Thomas and Affirmative Action: Bad Faith, Confusion, or Both?, WAKE FOREST L.
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ism, as I have pointed out elsewhere, that traces to Thomas Jef-
ferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King Jr., and an
originalism that places the Declaration of Independence at the
heart of the American conception of civil rights.50
When Jefferson wrote the Declaration during the summer of
1776, he was inspired by the prevailing individual rights political
theory of the day (most notably, that of 17th century British theo-
rist John Locke). When Lincoln condemned slavery in the 1850s
and 1860s, he was doing so on individual rights grounds (slaves
were people, Lincoln insisted, who were entitled to enjoy the
rights of individuals-especially the right to be free). And when
Reverend King delivered his famous "I Have a Dream" speech in
REV. ONLINE 11 (2013), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2013/02/justice-thomas-and-affirm
ative-action-bad-faith-confusion-or-both. Mark V. Tushnet, by contrast, appreciates the
distinction in Justice Thomas's jurisprudence between liberal originalism and conserva-
tive originalism. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96 (2005) ("The law professor Scott Gerber suggests that
positions like this reflect a division within Thomas, between what Gerber calls liberal
originalism, which tells judges to interpret the Constitution in light of the Declaration of
Independence, and conservative or Borkean originalism, which tells them to regard the
compromises embedded in the Constitution as expressing the framers' underlying princi-
ples .... There's surely something to Gerber's position."); Mark Tushnet, Kormendy Lec-
ture: Understanding the Rehnquist Court, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (2005) (same).
Tushnet, as generous a scholar as there is in the legal academy, is almost certainly the
most prolific Left wing constitutional law professor of the present day. See generally Timo-
thy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 489
(2004) (discussing my [Scott Gerber's] liberal originalist theory of constitutional interpre-
tation); Book Note, Justice Thomas's Inconsistent Originalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1431,
1434-35 (2008) (reviewing CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A MEMOIR
(2007)) ("Professor Scott Gerber has aptly observed a dichotomy in Justice Thomas's juris-
prudence. He notes that Justice Thomas takes a 'liberal originalist' approach to civil rights
issues, particularly affirmative action, and a 'conservative originalist' approach to civil lib-
erties issues, such as abortion.").
50. The analysis that follows in this section borrows from several of my earlier works.
See, e.g., Scott D. Gerber, Opinion, Justice Thomas and Mr. Jefferson, LEGAL TIMES (May
5, 2003), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=900005386271/Justice-Thomas-and-Mr-Je
fferson [hereinafter Gerber, Justice Thomas and Mr. Jefferson]. For more about 'liberal
originalism" in general, see GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 1; Scott D.
Gerber, Liberal Originalism: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2014). 'Liberal originalism" maintains that the Constitution
should be interpreted in light of the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independ-
ence. "Conservative originalism" dictates that judges should endeavor to discern the origi-
nal intent and/or original understanding of the Constitution's authors. One of the conclu-
sions of my book about Justice Thomas's jurisprudence is that he is a liberal originalist in
civil rights cases and a conservative originalist in other areas of constitutional law. See
GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 193. It was Justice Thomas's shared interest
in the Declaration that led me to start writing about him in the first place. See, e.g., Ger-
ber, Justice for Clarence Thomas, supra note 2, at 667-68; see also Gordon S. Wood & Scott
D. Gerber, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 435, 445-46
(2013) (transcript of a debate about originalism).
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1963, his "dream" was that his children would one day live in a
nation "where they will not be judged by the color of their skin
but by the content of their character."5' Clarence Thomas shares
this vision of the American regime. He has for most of his public
life.
For example, Thomas wrote in a 1987 article in the Howard
Law Journal that the "founding principles of equality and liberty"
set forth in the Declaration of Independence "dictate the policy of
action towards Black Americans."52 The then-chairman of the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") cred-
ited the first Justice Harlan as the initial member of the Supreme
Court to appreciate the connection between the Declaration and
the enforcement of the nation's civil rights laws.5" In particular,
Justice Thomas applauded Justice Harlan's solitary dissent in the
infamous 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the case in which the
Court constitutionalized the practice of racial segregation.54 It
was in that stinging dissent that Justice Harlan coined the
phrase that would later become so closely associated with Justice
Thomas himself: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."'5
Similarly, in a 1985 article in the Stetson Law Review Thomas
discussed his daily responsibilities of enforcing the nation's civil
rights laws as chairman of the EEOC. His rejection of the agen-
cy's group-based emphasis was clear. He wrote:
I intend to take EEO enforcement back to where it started by de-
fending the rights of individuals who are hurt by discriminatory
practices. To do this, we intend to pursue individual cases as well as
pattern and practice cases.... Those who insist on arguing that the
principal [sic] of equal opportunity, the cornerstone of civil rights,
means preferences for certain groups have relinquished their roles
as moral and ethical leaders in this area. I bristle at the thought, for
example, that it is morally proper to protest against minority racial
preferences in South Africa while arguing for such preferences
here.'6
51. Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream, Address Delivered at the Lincoln Memo-
rial in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted in THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT 317, 319 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002).
52. Clarence Thomas, Toward a 'Plain Reading" of the Constitution-The Declaration
of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J. 983, 983-84 (1987).
53. Id. at 991-92.
54. Id. at 992.
55. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Clarence Thomas, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Reflections
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Thomas's critics strived during his 1991 Supreme Court con-
firmation process to mischaracterize his views about the Declara-
tion of Independence. For example, Harvard Law School Profes-
sor Laurence H. Tribe wrote in a scathing New York Times op-ed
that Thomas would use the Declaration to turn back the clock to
the darkest days of the nation's history:
Most conservatives criticize the judiciary for expanding its powers,
"creating" rights rather than "interpreting" the Constitution....
Clarence Thomas, judging from his speeches and scholarly writings,
seems instead to believe judges should enforce the Founders' natural
law philosophy-the inalienable rights "given man by his Creator"-
which he maintains is revealed most completely in the Declaration of
Independence. He is the first Supreme Court nominee in 50 years to
maintain that natural law should be readily consulted in constitu-
tional interpretation.7
What critics such as Tribe failed to mention was that Thomas
was articulating the standard individual rights interpretation of
the Declaration-the same interpretation shared by Jefferson,
Lincoln, and King. "[T]o secure these rights," the Declaration pro-
claims, "governments are instituted among men.'"" Indeed,
Thomas made this point repeatedly during his confirmation bat-
tle. For instance, when asked by then-Senator Howard Metzen-
baum (D-Ohio), arguably his most unwavering opponent on the
Judiciary Committee, about a speech he had previously given,
Thomas responded:
[T]he point I think throughout these speeches is a notion that we
should be careful about the relationship between the Government
and the individual and should be careful that the Government itself
does not at some point displace or infringe on the rights of the indi-
vidual. That is a concern, as I have noted here, that runs throughout
my speeches. 5'
Justice Thomas has continued to speak publicly about the Dec-
laration of Independence since his confirmation to the Supreme
Court. He reminded the faculty and students of James Madison
on a New Philosophy, 15 STETSON L. REV. 29, 35 (1985). Of course apartheid is no longer
the law in South Africa. See, e.g., Apartheid, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, http:I
www.britannica.com/topic/apartheid (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
57. Laurence H. Tribe, Opinion, Clarence Thomas and "Natural Law," N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1991, at A15.
58. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
59. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 431 (1991)
(statement of Clarence Thomas, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit).
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University that Madison, the chief architect of the Constitution,
based it on "universal principles," which "[w]e find ... most suc-
cinctly and, indeed, elegantly stated by Madison's close friend,
Thomas Jefferson, in our Declaration of Independence."6 Justice
Thomas went on in his speech to describe how the Constitution
secures the rights promised to all Americans by the Declaration."
Justice Thomas's critics would be well served by reading this
speech.
His critics also should read his February 9, 1999, Lincoln Day
address to the Claremont Institute. There, Justice Thomas urges
the American people "to be ever vigilant in reminding us-me and
everyone else who has the privilege of serving our nation through
public office-of the principles of our founding and how they ap-
ply to the controversies of our time."62 That speech, in my judg-
ment, is the most significant speech about the Declaration of In-
dependence since Reverend King's "I Have a Dream."
Justice Thomas is, of course, not alone in his commitment to
the Declaration of Independence. However, what makes him the
most important voice today on the Declaration is the official posi-
tion he occupies in the American regime: one of nine members of
the nation's highest Court. Justice Thomas, in short, has the
power to do something about effectuating the individual rights
principles of the Declaration. His civil rights opinions and votes-
several of which he cites in his Fisher I opinion-demonstrate
that he has been more than willing to act on those principles dur-
ing his tenure on the Court.
In 1995's Missouri v. Jenkins, for example, Justice Thomas be-
came the first Supreme Court Justice to directly criticize Brown
v. Board of Education. Although he called state-mandated segre-
gation "despicable," he said that the Court was wrong in 1954 to
rely on disputable social science evidence to declare segregation
unconstitutional rather than invoking the constitutional principle
60. Clarence Thomas, James Madison Day Lecture, Remarks Delivered at James
Madison University (Mar. 15, 2001), http://www.jmu.eduljmuweb/general/news2/general
200132382450.shtml.
61. Id.
62. Clarence Thomas, The Virtue of Practical Wisdom, Remarks Delivered at the
Third Annual Claremont Institute Lincoln Day Colloquium (Feb. 9, 1999), reprinted in
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT 243, 247 (Scott Douglas Ger-
ber ed., 2002).
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that "the government must treat citizens as individuals, and not
as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.""
Justice Thomas's conception of civil rights as an individual, not
a group, concern also explains his approach to voting rights. In
1994's Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas wrote in a concurring opin-
ion that racial groups should not "be conceived of largely as politi-
cal interest groups," that blacks do not all think alike, and that
existing case law should be overturned to eliminate claims for
"proportional allocation of political power according to race.'
Justice Thomas echoed these views in several more recent Voting
Rights Act cases, including Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District Number One v. Holder" and Shelby County v. Holder.6
He again wrote separately in those cases.6 7
With respect to racial preferences, Justice Thomas issued three
separate opinions on the subject that laid the groundwork for his
concurring opinion in Fisher L In Adarand, the 1995 government
contracting case that, like Fisher I, seemingly called the constitu-
tionality of racial preferences into serious question, Justice
Thomas invoked the Declaration of Independence as the rule of
decision.6" He wrote:
There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the
heart of this [affirmative action] program is at war with the principle
of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. See
Declaration of Independence ("We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
63. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 118, 120-21, 123 (1994) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
64. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905, 912 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
65. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 229 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
66. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631-32 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
67. See id.; Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 557 U.S. at 212 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
68. Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). It is possible to find racial preferences unconstitu-
tional without invoking the Declaration of Independence. Justice Scalia did not rely on the
Declaration. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher 1), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Scal-
ia, J., concurring). Other leading conservative civil rights lawyers and scholars focus on
the text and history of the 14th Amendment. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Originalism and Af-
firmative Action, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com
bench-memosI345181/originalism-and-affirmative-action-roger-clegg (citing his own work
and that of Michael Rappaport).
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their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are
Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness").d
Justice Thomas again invoked the Declaration in his twenty-
nine-page separate opinion in the 2003 University of Michigan af-
firmative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger. After criticizing the
Grutter majority for "fail[ing] to justify its decision by reference to
any principle,"7 Justice Thomas closed his opinion by reminding
his colleagues that the controlling principle-that articulated in
the Declaration-required the case to come out the other way. He
wrote:
[T]he majority has placed its imprimatur on a practice that can only
weaken the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of In-
dependence and the Equal Protection Clause.... It has been nearly
140 years since Frederick Douglass asked the intellectual ancestors
of the Law School to "[d]o nothing with us!" and the Nation adopted
the Fourteenth Amendment. Now we must wait another 25 years to
see this principle of equality vindicated. I therefore respectfully dis-
sent ....
In the racial preferences case decided most closely in time with
Fisher I, 2007's Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, Justice Thomas continued with this
theme.72 He wrote:
The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a colorblind Con-
stitution by consigning it to me and Members of today's plurality....
But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the
Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy: "Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
"73
zens.
V. CONCLUSION: SCHUETTE (2014) & FISHER 11 (2016)
The Left's intelligentsia conveniently fails to mention that "[a]
clear majority of Americans, 67 percent, are opposed to consider-
ing race and ethnicity in college admissions," and instead insist
69. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
70. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 357 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
71. Id. at 378.
72. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748, 779,
782 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 772.
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"that students should be admitted solely based on merit.74 In
short, most Americans agree with Justice Thomas, which makes
the vitriol heaped upon him on the subject of racial preferences
even more inappropriate than it already is.
75
Clarence Thomas has written and spoken more forcefully about
the Declaration of Independence than any public figure since
Martin Luther King Jr.76 His profound commitment to the indi-
vidual rights principles of the nation's founding document has
helped bring the Supreme Court o the verge of doing what a lib-
eral originalist understands the Constitution to require it to do:
declare racial preferences unconstitutional, so that every Ameri-
can is judged by the content of his or her character rather than by
the color of his or her skin.
The people of Michigan embraced this fundamental tenet of
liberal originalism when they amended Michigan's state constitu-
tion in 2006 to forbid state-sponsored racial preferences in Michi-
gan. The amendment, commonly known as "Prop 2," provides that
the "state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public em-
ployment, public education, or public contracting."77
74. Allie Bidwell, Majority of Americans Oppose Affirmative Action in College Admis-
sions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 24, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
newsgramnarticles/2013/07/24majority-of-americans-oppose-affirmative-action-in-colege-
admissions (discussing a Gallup poll).
75. Justice Thomas's opposition to racial preferences has long subjected him to insult-
ing remarks from the Left. For example, in response to his separate opinion in Grutter,
Maureen Dowd wrote in her New York Times column that Justice Thomas's opinion "is a
clinical study of a man who has been driven barking mad by the beneficial treatment he
has received," while Henry Louis Gates Jr. called the nation's highest-ranking African
American jurist a "hypocrite" on the subject. Maureen Dowd, Opinion, Could Thomas Be
Right?, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/25/opinion/could-
thomas-be-right.html; Kyla King, Harvard Educator Touts Affirmative Action: The Head
of the University's Black Studies Program Calls Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas a
Hypocrite, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 15, 2002, at All (quoting Professor Gates).
76. See, e.g., Scott Douglas Gerber, Opinion, Clarence Thomas' Moment, HOUS.
CHRON. (Nov. 16, 2012, 7:29 PM), http://www.chron.com/default/article/Clarence.Thomas-
moment-4045059.php. The Left does not like it when I point this out. See, e.g., Ronald
Turner, Opinion, On King and Color-Blindness, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 26, 2012, 5:41 PM),
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/On-King-and-color-blindness-4068057.php
(an op-ed by a University of Houston law professor about my op-ed in the Houston Chroni-
cle).
77. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2).
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The campaign for the passage of Prop 2 was spearheaded by
Ward Connerly and Jennifer Gratz7 s Connerly is a wealthy Afri-
can American Republican who helped pass a similar amendment
to the California state constitution in the 1990s.'9 Gratz was one
of the plaintiffs in the 2003 decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
holding that the University of Michigan may, as a matter of fed-
eral constitutional law, consider the race of applicants as a factor
in admissions decisions, provided that it is not used too mechani-
cally and that all applicants are evaluated on an individualized
basis."s Of course, it was the University of Michigan cases that
the Supreme Court concluded the Fifth Circuit had failed to apply
properly in Fisher I, and it was the University of Michigan cases
that Justice Thomas said should be overruled.
Many on the academic Left have long endorsed a theory known
as "popular constitutionalism": the idea that constitutional law
should be defined outside of the courts by the people themselves,
"whether ... we act in the streets, in the voting booths, or in leg-
islatures as representatives of others."'" The Left's commitment to
popular constitutionalism is what made the recent challenge to
Prop 2 so bizarre: the people of Michigan were engaged in the ul-
timate expression of popular constitutionalism when they amend-
ed their state constitution to render the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in the University of Michigan cases inapplicable in the state
of Michigan. But, as I have mentioned twice before in this article,
racial preferences are the sacred cow of the Left. Legal consisten-
cy obviously gave way to political expediency in the Left's chal-
lenge to Prop 2.
78. Scott Gerber, Opinion, Michigan's Controversial Proposition 2, Eliminating Af-
firmative Action Programs in the State: A Good Example of Popular Constitutionalism?,
FINDLAw (Nov. 16, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20061116-gerber.
html [hereinafter Gerber, Michigan's Controversial Proposition 2]; Tamar Lewin, Race
Preferences Vote Splits Michigan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.nytimes.comI
2006/10/31/us/31michigan.html?_r=2&.
79. Lewin, supra note 78.
80. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
81. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181 (1999);
see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT 5 (1999). Sunstein focuses on the judicial, rather than the popu-
lar, side of the question and calls his theory "judicial minimalism." He agrees with Tush-
net and Kramer that the people, not the Court, should enjoy the primary responsibility for
determining what the Constitution means. For a critique of popular constitutionalism, see
Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of Ideas, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1067 (2008).
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On October 15, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
in that challenge, Schuette v. Michigan Coalition to Defend Af-
firmative Action.2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
had ruled in the case that prohibiting racial preferences through
a ballot initiative that amends the Michigan constitution is dis-
criminatory because it puts minorities who want to change the
law at a disadvantage."3 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Prop 2
violates the guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution that "all citizens ought to have equal access to
the tools of political change."4 What the Sixth Circuit failed to
appreciate, however, is that every Michigan voter did have "equal
access" to the democratic process. Proponents of racial prefer-
ences simply lost the vote.5 By definition, in a democracy, some-
body loses. In the apt words of Michigan Attorney General Bill
Schuette, "[I]t's fundamentally wrong to treat people differently
based on the color of your skin or your gender or your ethnicity.
We said no to that in Michigan.""
On April 22, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled 6-2 that the people
of Michigan were allowed to ban preferential treatment in the
state.7 The Justices in the majority, albeit in a series of splin-
tered opinions, concluded that policies affecting minorities that do
not involve intentional discrimination should be decided at the
ballot box rather than in the courts.8 Justice Sotomayor-who
conceded in her memoir that she had been admitted to both
82. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org
cases/2013/12-682 (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
83. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466,
485 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
84. Id. at 470.
85. See Gerber, Michigan's Controversial Proposition 2, supra note 78.
86. David Eggert, AG Schuette Focused on Victims, Legal Culture Wars, CBS (Dec. 31,
2013, 6:16 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2013/12/31/ag-schuette-focused-on-victims-legal
-culture-wars/ (quoting Bill Schuette).
87. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). Justice
Kagan did not participate in the decision. Id. at 1638. The Court's decision legitimated
similar measures in other states. See Adam Liptak, Court Backs Michigan on Affirmative
Action, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/uslsupreme-court-
michigan-affirmative-action-ban.html.
88. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito); id. at 1638 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1639 (Scal-
ia, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Justice Thomas); id. at 1648 (Breyer, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
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Princeton University and Yale Law School on the basis of affirm-
ative action89-disagreed vehemently in a lengthy dissent in
which Justice Ginsburg joined.9"
Significantly, for Justices Thomas and Scalia Schuette provided
another opportunity to point out that the Court's "sorry line of
race-based-admissions cases" permitting colleges and universities
to take race into account were wrong.91 They also suggested that
those decisions were in jeopardy,92 which is where 2016's Fisher II
comes in.
The Supreme Court rarely explains why it is granting certiora-
ri," but its decision to revisit the Fisher case indicates that at
least four of the Justices in the majority were not pleased with
how the Fifth Circuit panel handled the case on remand.4 Who
can blame them?9 After all, the Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded the same panel's prior decision on the ground that the
panel impermissibly deferred to the University on the dispositive
question of whether race was being used in too heavy-handed a
fashion in the admissions program.
Although the Fifth Circuit panel gave lip service in its latest
ruling to the Supreme Court's instructions to review the Univer-
sity's admissions program with-in the panel's words--"more ex-
acting scrutiny,"96 it simply repeated its previous mistake of de-
ferring to the University too much. The dissenting judge, Emilio
M. Garza, pointed this out repeatedly in one of the most persua-
sive lower court opinions I have ever read. For example, as Judge
Garza made clear, what the Supreme Court actually instructed
the Fifth Circuit panel to do on remand was afford the University
"no deference" at all with respect to its assertion that its chosen
89. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, My BELOVED WORLD 191 (2013).
90. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1651-83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas joined Justice
Scalia's opinion. Id.
92. See id. at 1639-40.
93. See, e.g., H.W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (1994).
94. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014), cert.
granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (June 29, 2015) (No. 14-981).
95. The three paragraphs that follow are drawn from Scott D. Gerber, Opinion, 5th
Circuit Thumbs Its Nose at U.S. Supreme Court in Racial Preferences Case, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 17, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-d-gerber/5th-circuit.
thumbs-its-scotus_b_5593356.html.
96. Fisher II, 758 F.3d at 637.
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"means... to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that
goal."97 Succinctly put, the University was required to explain
"with clarity" what it meant by the "critical mass" of minority
students that it was endeavoring to enroll.9" It failed to do so. In-
stead, the University offered the predictable sorts of dissemblings
that colleges and universities typically offer when they are trying
to convince reviewing authorities that their illegal admissions
programs are not illegal. As Judge Garza aptly put it, "At best,
the University's attempted articulations of 'critical mass' before
this court are subjective, circular, or tautological.""9
The Supreme Court knew this, and that is precisely why it va-
cated and remanded the case in 2013. It is profoundly disturbing
that Judges Patrick E. Higginbotham and Carolyn Dineen King
let the University play the same game all over again. (Judge Gar-
za finally recognized what the University was up to, which is why
he switched from ruling for the University in the original appeal
to ruling against it on remand.)
On the plus side, perhaps the Fisher case will end up where
Ms. Fisher wanted it to end up in the first place: with the nation's
highest Court declaring once and for all that the Constitution re-
quires that colleges and universities assess applicants as individ-
uals rather than as members of racial or ethnic groups.' ° She has
some reason to be optimistic: remember that in the 2014 Schuette
decision the Court ruled that the people of Michigan may amend
their state constitution to forbid any consideration of race alto-
gether because colleges and universities can't be trusted to use it
modestly and because at least some lower courts don't seem to
care that they don't.
I would bet the ranch that Justice Thomas will vote to abolish
racial preferences in Fisher II, just as he did in Fisher I. The wild
97. Id. at 665 (Garza, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 666.
99. Id. at 667.
100. Not surprisingly, the blogosphere has been inundated with speculation about why
the Court agreed to hear Fisher again and how the Justices will decide the case the second
time around. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon & Adam Liptak, How Will the Supreme Court Rule
on Affirmative Action?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com2015/12/08/ma
gazine/how-will-the-supreme-court-rule-on-affirmative-action.html?_r=0; Lyle Denniston,
The Mystery of Fisher II Review, SCOTUSBLOG (July 21, 2015, 12:09 AM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2015/07/the-mystery-of-fisher.ii-review/; Alison Somin, Supreme Court
Preview: Of Fisher II and Paper Tigers, FEDERALIST SOC'Y (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.fed-
soc.orglblog/detail/supreme-court-preview-of-fisher-ii-and-paper-tigers.
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card, as always, is Justice Kennedy, who has never voted to up-
hold a race-based admissions program, but who also has dis-
played a willingness to permit colleges and universities to contin-
ue to take race into account on the naive assumption that they
will do so honestly. It is time to face reality: they do not, and they
never will.'
Justice Antonin Scalia died unexpectedly on February 13,
2016.02 At least two jurisprudential questions arise from this
tragic event: (1) how will Justice Scalia's death affect the outcome
in Fisher II and (2) what will be the impact of his death on Jus-
tice Thomas's role on the Court?
With respect to the first question, Justice Scalia's death proba-
bly will not have much impact on the outcome of Fisher II. Unlike
a number of other closely watched cases on the Court's docket
this Term, because Justice Kagan will not be participating in
Fisher I either, there is no possibility of a 4-4 vote in the case.
Justices Thomas and Alito and Chief Justice Roberts almost cer-
tainly remain solid votes against the University's racial prefer-
ences program, while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor
are strong supporters of it. In short, the case still turns on what
Justice Kennedy decides to do,0 3 although the Court itself
might-but probably won't-be reluctant to decide such an im-
portant case with only seven Justices participating.
The second question, the potential impact of Justice Scalia's
death on Justice Thomas's role on the Court, dominated the news
cycle when, on February 29, 2016, Justice Thomas asked his first
question during oral argument in a decade.0 4 The speculation
101. I first made this argument when the University of Michigan cases had been ar-
gued but not yet decided. See Scott D. Gerber, Opinion, A Naive Notion Gone Awry, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 7, 2003, at A18. Nothing has happened in the decade-plus that has elapsed since
then to change my mind. Indeed, I am more convinced than ever of this unpleasant ruth.
102. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justice Scalia, Who Led Court's Conservative Renaissance,
Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2016, at Al.
103. For a fascinating essay on what Justice Kennedy might do in Fisher II, see Rich-
ard Lempert, Justice Kennedy and the Fisher Revisit: Will the Irrelevant Prove Decisive?
(Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 499,
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2740431.
104. See Scott Douglas Gerber, Opinion, Clarence Thomas' Views to Loom Larger at
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seems to be that Justice Thomas, as the Court's only remaining
proponent of the historical approach to interpreting the Constitu-
tion, will step into Justice Scalia's shoes as the nation's leading
voice on conservative constitutional theory."5 The New York
Times' Adam Liptak made this point with particular poignancy:
"Justice Scalia's death was a sort of passing of the baton, leaving
Justice Thomas as the only member of the court fully committed
to the mode of constitutional interpretation known as originalism,
which seeks to apply the understanding of those who drafted and
ratified the Constitution."'0 6
What statements such as that of Liptak fail to appreciate, how-
ever, is that, although Justices Scalia and Thomas tended to vote
together in civil rights cases, they approached those cases differ-
ently in at least one critical respect: Justice Scalia declined to
sign on to those portions of Justice Thomas's opinions that in-
voked the Declaration of Independence as the rule of decision.
And while it can be argued that Justices Scalia and Thomas were
both consistent opponents of racial preferences, and it therefore
does not matter that one approached the issue as a conservative
originalist and the other as a liberal originalist, it would be a mis-
take to say it does not matter. Ideas matter in constitutional law.
Indeed, Justice Scalia was a titan on the Court because of the
power of his ideas about conservative originalism, not because of
the results he managed to achieve."°7
I doubt that Justice Scalia's passing will transform Justice
Thomas into the loquacious questioner during oral argument that
Justice Scalia was. With any luck, however, Justice Thomas's lib-
eral originalism will come to supplant Justice Scalia's conserva-
tive originalism as the predominant alternative to the so-called
progressive constitutionalism of the Court's Democratic appoin-
tees. Justice Scalia himself appeared open to the possibility: Just
last Term he finally joined in full an opinion that Justice Thomas
authored that invoked the Declaration of Independence. That
opinion, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in the same-sex
marriage case of Obergefell v. Hodges, also marked the first time
105. Id. What follows borrows from id.
106. Adam Liptak, Thomas Ends 10-Year Silence on the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2016, at Al.
107. The Second Amendment case District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) was arguably
Justice Scalia's only significant originalist majority opinion during his entire thirty-year
tenure. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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that Justice Thomas has appealed to the Declaration in a case
that did not involve race.'°8 As I mentioned in First Principles, the
jurisprudence of the American Founding mandates that liberal
originalism be applied in all categories of constitutional law. 1°9
108. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia actually cited the Declaration of Independence in his own dissenting opinion
in the case. See id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Scott Douglas Gerber,
Opinion, Clarence Thomas, Gay Marriage and the Declaration of Independence, WASH.
EXAMINER (July 3, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/clarence-thom
as-gay-marriage-and-the-declaration-of-independence/article/2567372.
109. See GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 2. See generally GERBER, To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS, supra note 1.
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